Compliance
Framework status, and a control-by-control map of SOC 2, ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A and the GDPR against where each control is implemented.
Where Vaethra stands, framework by framework
| Framework | Status | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| SOC 2 (Security, Availability, Confidentiality) | Controls implemented Attestation in progress |
Vaethra's security programme is built to the AICPA Trust Services Criteria, and the control map in §2 sets out each criterion against where it is implemented. A Type II attestation requires an audit observation window, which is under way; the report will be provided under NDA when issued. |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Controls implemented Certification in progress |
The information security management system is built to the Annex A control set, mapped in §3. Certification by an accredited body is in progress. Vaethra is not yet certified and does not claim to be. |
| GDPR / UK GDPR | Compliant | Vaethra Technologies LLC is established in the United States and processes personal data falling under the GDPR as a processor for its customers. A Data Processing Agreement is available at /legal/dpa, incorporating the 2021 Standard Contractual Clauses and the UK Addendum. Article-by-article mapping in §4. |
| CCPA / CPRA | Compliant | Vaethra does not sell or share personal information as those terms are defined. There is no advertising, no data broker and no cross-context behavioural profiling. |
| PCI DSS | Out of scope | Vaethra never receives, transmits or stores cardholder data. Invoicing is by bank transfer, and any future card payment would be handled entirely by a PCI-compliant processor. |
| HIPAA | Out of scope | Vaethra does not process protected health information and does not sign Business Associate Agreements. The public epidemiological feeds we read carry no individual health data. |
| NIS2 | Aligned | Vaethra is not established in the EU and is not an in-scope essential or important entity under any national transposition. Where a customer is, our notification timelines are set to support their reporting obligations — see incident response. |
| EU AI Act | Limited risk, disclosed | Language models are used for text extraction, relationship assessment and embedding. No biometric processing, no automated decisions about individuals, no emotion recognition. Model output is labelled as model output wherever it appears. See architecture §4. |
| TISAX, FedRAMP, IRAP, C5 | Not held | Not held and not currently in progress. If one is a requirement for your organisation, raise it early and we will give you a straight answer on scope and timing. |
Each Trust Services Criterion, and where it is implemented
Read against the 2017 Trust Services Criteria (2022 revision). Every row links to the page that describes the control in full, so this table can be used as an index rather than as a summary.
CC1 — Control environment
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC1.1 Integrity and ethical values | Written code of conduct and confidentiality undertaking signed before any access is granted | Security §7 |
| CC1.2 Board oversight | The engineering owner is accountable for security; the risk register is reviewed quarterly and after any incident | Security §9 |
| CC1.3 Structures and reporting lines | Security ownership, escalation path and named contacts documented | Security §9–10 |
| CC1.4 Competence | Background checks for roles with production access; security responsibilities set out in engagement terms | Access control §5 |
| CC1.5 Accountability | Individual accounts only, no shared credentials; every change attributable in version control | Development §2 |
CC2 — Communication and information
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC2.1 Quality information | Health, status and uptime answered by the running system on public endpoints; per-source health published | Status |
| CC2.2 Internal communication | Findings delivered to an on-call channel on state change, with a daily summary of anything open | Availability §3 |
| CC2.3 External communication | This trust centre; incident communication commitments; 30 days' subprocessor notice; 90 days' API deprecation notice | Trust centre, Support §5 |
CC3 — Risk assessment
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC3.1 Objectives specified | Security objectives documented in the information security policy | Policy set, under NDA |
| CC3.2 Risks identified and analysed | Risk register: risk, likelihood, impact, owner, treatment | Register, under NDA |
| CC3.3 Fraud risk considered | Assessed as part of the register; separation of read and write paths; no payment handling in scope | Register, under NDA |
| CC3.4 Significant change assessed | Risk reviewed on architecture change and after every incident | Security §9 |
CC4 — Monitoring of controls
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC4.1 Ongoing evaluations | Four layers of monitoring, including automated integrity checks that test whether controls are still working rather than whether jobs completed | Availability §3 |
| CC4.2 Deficiencies communicated | Alerts on state change to the on-call channel; findings summarised publicly on the status page | Status |
CC5 — Control activities
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC5.1 Control selection | Controls selected against the risk register and implemented in code where possible rather than in policy | Development §4 |
| CC5.2 Technology controls | Deny-by-default database authorisation, licence filtering in a shared query builder, fail-closed authorisation and caching | Security §5, Data protection §2 |
| CC5.3 Policies and procedures | Documented policy set covering access, change, incident, cryptography, vendors and continuity | Policy set, under NDA |
CC6 — Logical and physical access
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC6.1 Logical access security | MFA required on every administrative account with no exception process; API keys stored as SHA-256 digests; row-level security deny-by-default on all 50 tables | Access control §1–2 |
| CC6.2 Registration and authorisation | Access granted at minimum level for the role; production access not granted by default; keys issued individually with scope | Access control §3 |
| CC6.3 Access modification and removal | Quarterly access reviews; revocation within one business day of a departure and immediately on an involuntary one, with credential rotation | Access control §4–5 |
| CC6.4 Physical access | No Vaethra-operated facilities. Inherited from Cloudflare and AWS. | Security §8 |
| CC6.5 Asset disposal | No physical media held. Disposal is performed by the infrastructure providers under their own attestations. | Data protection §5 |
| CC6.6 External threat protection | Web application firewall, bot management and DDoS protection at the edge; per-caller rate limiting; no public database listener | Architecture §7 |
| CC6.7 Transmission and movement of data | TLS 1.2 minimum with HSTS; restricted egress; extracts served through the API rather than from a public bucket | Data protection §3 |
| CC6.8 Malicious software prevention | No general-purpose compute to infect; immutable deployments; pinned dependencies with continuous scanning; commit scanning for credentials | Vulnerability management §1 |
CC7 — System operations
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC7.1 Vulnerability detection | Continuous dependency scanning; configuration review; automated integrity checks in production | Vulnerability management §1, §3 |
| CC7.2 Monitoring for anomalies | Health, source, job and data integrity monitoring; rate-limit and authorisation failure logging | Availability §3 |
| CC7.3 Security event evaluation | Three-level severity model with defined acknowledgement windows | Incident response §1 |
| CC7.4 Incident response | Six-step process: declare, contain, notify, investigate, remediate, report | Incident response §3 |
| CC7.5 Recovery from incidents | Immutable rollback in about a minute; restore procedure with integrity verification before recovery is declared | Business continuity §4 |
CC8 — Change management
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC8.1 Change authorisation and testing | Six gates: branch, type check, 985 automated tests, review, immutable deploy, post-deploy verification. Database changes are versioned migrations recorded in a ledger. | Development §1–2 |
CC9 — Risk mitigation
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| CC9.1 Business disruption mitigation | Stateless global edge, isolated data sources, encrypted backups, committed recovery objectives, annual DR exercise | Business continuity |
| CC9.2 Vendor and partner management | Subprocessors assessed before engagement and reviewed annually; contractual terms no weaker than those we give customers; 30 days' notice of change | Subprocessors §3–4 |
A1 — Availability, C1 — Confidentiality
| Criterion | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| A1.1 Capacity management | Storage headroom and growth measured continuously from observed data rather than assumed; edge caching absorbs load spikes | Availability §2 |
| A1.2 Backup and recovery infrastructure | Encrypted backups stored separately from the primary; independent raw archives with a second provider; infrastructure reproducible from source control | Business continuity §1 |
| A1.3 Recovery testing | Rollback exercised continuously; restore tested to a scratch instance with a written report; annual DR exercise | Business continuity §5 |
| C1.1 Confidential information identified | Four-class data classification with defined handling for each | Data protection §1 |
| C1.2 Confidential information disposed of | Deletion within 30 days of a verified request across primary storage and caches; backups age out within the retention window | Data protection §5 |
The 2022 control set, by theme
Annex A of ISO/IEC 27001:2022 groups 93 controls into four themes. The rows below cover the controls applicable to Vaethra's scope; controls relating to facilities we do not operate are marked as inherited from the infrastructure providers, each of which publishes its own attestations — listed per provider on /security/subprocessors.
A.5 — Organisational controls
| Control | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| A.5.1 Policies for information security | Documented policy set, reviewed at least annually and after any incident | Policy set, under NDA |
| A.5.2 Information security roles | The engineering owner is accountable; responsibilities set out in engagement terms | Security §9 |
| A.5.7 Threat intelligence | Provider advisories, dependency advisories and CISA KEV monitored; CISA KEV is itself one of our ingested sources | Vulnerability management §1 |
| A.5.8 Security in project management | Security review is part of the change process rather than a separate gate | Development §1 |
| A.5.9–5.11 Asset inventory, acceptable use, return of assets | Asset register maintained; acceptable use in the policy set; offboarding removes device access and company data | Access control §5 |
| A.5.12–5.14 Classification, labelling, transfer | Four-class classification; every record carries its source and licence; transfer restricted by class | Data protection §1, §2 |
| A.5.15–5.18 Access control, identity, authentication, rights | Least privilege, individual identities, MFA everywhere, quarterly review | Access control |
| A.5.19–5.22 Supplier relationships | Subprocessors assessed before engagement, contractually bound, reviewed annually, and published | Subprocessors |
| A.5.23 Cloud services security | Two providers, both attested; configuration reviewed; no self-managed infrastructure | Security §2 |
| A.5.24–5.28 Incident management | Documented process with severity model, notification deadlines, evidence preservation and post-incident report | Incident response |
| A.5.29–5.30 Continuity and ICT readiness | Committed recovery objectives, five documented scenarios, tested restore | Business continuity |
| A.5.31–5.34 Legal, IP, records, privacy | Licence classification enforced in code and database; GDPR programme; statutory records retention | Data protection, Privacy |
| A.5.35–5.37 Review, compliance, procedures | Quarterly review of this documentation and of access; control-by-control mapping maintained here | This page |
A.6 — People controls
| Control | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| A.6.1 Screening | Background checks for roles with production access, to the extent applicable employment law permits | Access control §5 |
| A.6.2 Terms and conditions of employment | Confidentiality undertaking signed before access is granted | Security §7 |
| A.6.3 Awareness and training | Security responsibilities in engagement terms; practice documented in the repository alongside the code | Development §4 |
| A.6.5 Responsibilities after termination | Access revoked within one business day, credentials rotated, record kept | Access control §5 |
| A.6.7 Remote working | Full-disk encrypted, screen-locked endpoints; no production data stored locally | Security §8 |
| A.6.8 Reporting security events | Published reporting address and disclosure process with commitments | Vulnerability management §5 |
A.7 — Physical controls
| Control | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| A.7.1–7.14 Physical perimeter, entry, equipment, media, disposal | Inherited. Vaethra operates no data centre, office server or physical infrastructure. Cloudflare and AWS hold ISO 27001, ISO 27017 and SOC 2 attestations covering these controls. | Security §8 |
| A.7.7 Clear desk and clear screen | Endpoint screen lock enforced; no printed material | Security §8 |
| A.7.9 Security of assets off-premises | Full-disk encryption on all endpoints; access through the same authenticated paths as any other client | Security §8 |
A.8 — Technological controls
| Control | How it is met | Where |
|---|---|---|
| A.8.1 User endpoint devices | Encrypted, screen-locked, no production data at rest | Security §8 |
| A.8.2–8.5 Privileged access, information access, source code, secure authentication | One production access holder; deny-by-default database authorisation; MFA everywhere; source access individually identified | Access control |
| A.8.6 Capacity management | Storage headroom and growth measured from observed data | Availability §2 |
| A.8.7 Protection against malware | No general-purpose compute; immutable deployments; pinned dependencies | Vulnerability management §1 |
| A.8.8 Management of technical vulnerabilities | Continuous scanning with severity-based patch windows: 24 hours critical, 7 days high, 30 days medium, 90 days low | Vulnerability management §2 |
| A.8.9 Configuration management | All configuration in version control; deployments immutable and versioned; database schema as ordered migrations | Development §2 |
| A.8.10 Information deletion | Deletion within 30 days of a verified request; backups age out | Data protection §5 |
| A.8.11 Data masking | Local development uses synthetic fixtures rather than a copy of production; API keys stored only as digests | Development §3 |
| A.8.12 Data leakage prevention | Licence filter enforced in the shared query builder and independently in the database, with an automated leakage probe | Data protection §2 |
| A.8.13 Information backup | Continuous backup with daily snapshots, encrypted, stored separately; restore tested | Business continuity §1 |
| A.8.14 Redundancy | Stateless globally distributed edge; automatic routing around a failed location | Availability §2 |
| A.8.15–8.16 Logging and monitoring | API request logging retained 12 months; source, job and integrity monitoring; alerting on state change | Security §6 |
| A.8.17 Clock synchronisation | Platform-managed time on all compute; every record carries both the source's timestamp and ours | Data protection §1 |
| A.8.19–8.20 Software on operational systems, network security | No operating system to manage; WAF, bot management and DDoS protection at the edge; no public database listener | Architecture §7 |
| A.8.21 Security of network services | All service-to-service traffic over TLS with secret-gated authorisation and a fixed operation allowlist | Architecture §1 |
| A.8.22 Segregation of networks | Production, preview and local separated; preview and local have no production data binding | Architecture §2 |
| A.8.23 Web filtering | Restrictive Content-Security-Policy on every page; no third-party scripts beyond the platform's own | Architecture §5 |
| A.8.24 Use of cryptography | TLS 1.2+ in transit, AES-256 at rest, SHA-256 for credential digests; documented cryptography policy | Data protection §3 |
| A.8.25–8.29 Secure development lifecycle | Secure coding standard, review, 985 automated tests including tests that assert controls refuse, static type checking, environment separation | Development §1, §4 |
| A.8.30 Outsourced development | Not applicable — development is not outsourced | — |
| A.8.31 Separation of environments | No shared staging environment holding production data | Development §3 |
| A.8.32 Change management | Six gates, immutable versioned deployments, rollback in about a minute | Development §1–2 |
| A.8.33 Test information | Synthetic fixtures only; production data is never copied into a test environment | Development §3 |
| A.8.34 Protection during audit testing | Audit access arranged in advance with scope agreed; scanning against production coordinated rather than ad hoc | DPA §9 |
Where each obligation is discharged
| Article | Obligation | How it is met |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 5 | Principles | Data minimisation is architectural — no accounts, no cookies, no profiles. Purpose limitation and storage limitation documented per category. Privacy §2 |
| Art. 6 | Lawfulness | A lawful basis stated for every category of processing. Privacy §2 |
| Art. 12–22 | Data subject rights | Access, rectification, erasure, restriction, portability and objection, answered within one month. Privacy §5 |
| Art. 24, 32 | Controller responsibility, security | Technical and organisational measures documented in full. DPA §14 |
| Art. 25 | Data protection by design and default | No accounts, no cookies, no third-party trackers, self-hosted fonts. There is no setting that turns tracking on. Privacy §1 |
| Art. 28 | Processor obligations | Executable DPA with subprocessor terms, audit rights and deletion obligations. DPA |
| Art. 30 | Records of processing | Maintained; available under NDA. Privacy §6 |
| Art. 33–34 | Breach notification | 72 hours to the supervisory authority and to affected customers, with the Article 33(3) content. Incident response §4 |
| Art. 35 | Impact assessments | Carried out where processing is likely to be high risk; the enterprise workspace will be assessed before it ships. Privacy §6 |
| Art. 37 | Data protection officer | Not required: core activities do not involve large-scale systematic monitoring of individuals or special-category data. The founder is accountable. Privacy §6 |
| Art. 44–49 | International transfers | 2021 Standard Contractual Clauses and the UK Addendum, with supplementary measures and government-access commitments. DPA §10–11 |
Four things, on request
- This documentation, as a single PDF — sixteen pages covering what a standard vendor security review asks, including the control maps above, with the cross-references intact.
- Your questionnaire, completed in writing. CAIQ, SIG Lite or a bespoke spreadsheet. Typical turnaround five business days.
- The evidence pack, under NDA — policies, risk register, access-control evidence, recovery test results, vendor assessments. Listed in full on the trust centre index.
- A call with the engineer who built the system, who can answer architecture questions directly.
If a specific certification or artefact is a condition of purchase, raise it on the first call and we will give you a date or a straight answer that we cannot meet it. Tell us what you need.